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Abstract 
 
On 21 March 2016, at the 9th Annual Update on World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute 
Settlement, former Chairman of the Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), 
Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto, spoke on the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
negotiations in light of recent dispute settlement experience. He expressed that changes to the 
DSU ought to promote the future efficiency and effectiveness of the WTO as a dispute 
settlement system. The proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) has been a 
recurrent curiosity for the WTO, with provisions often competing and overlapping. Earlier 
work studying these interactions emphasises uncertainty in the application of non-WTO law, 
including PTAs, to WTO disputes and highlights the WTO’s implicit claim to supremacy. The 
purpose of this article is to critically analyse the state-of-play of negotiations on improvements 
and clarifications of the DSU in addressing PTAs. It examines whether current DSU proposals 
meet the DSB’s intended objectives and suggests solutions where problematic uncertainties 
remain. The article concludes that PTAs have not been sufficiently regarded by negotiators and 
that more express measures are required in the DSU to clarify such uncertainties and harmonise 
with PTAs in order to preserve the WTO’s future legitimacy. 
 
I Introduction 
 
The interactions between the non-discriminatory multilateral trading system under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the discriminatory non-multilateral trading system under 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) has been the subject of a great many studies.1 The 
‘spaghetti bowl’ continues to deepen (as at 1 July 2016, 460 PTAs have been signed, of which 
267 are currently in force); and mega-regional trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are developing, despite the protectionist zeal of the 
Presidency of Donald Trump.2 Inevitably, the increasing availability of forum choice and ever 
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overlapping obligations under the various PTAs will cause conflict.3 Yet, there is still not a 
satisfactory answer to explain either what approach dispute settlement bodies should take to 
PTAs in the presence of overlapping dispute proceedings or precisely what the applicable law 
to such conflicts should be. Despite a great deal of focus on the possible legal principles to 
remedy such conflicts, there has been little discussion as to potential approaches in the context 
of the aims of the WTO. In light of the recent negotiations for changes to the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), further discussion on procedural and substantive conflicts with PTAs 
will benefit from the insights and intentions expressed by the WTO Members.4  
 
This article, thus, seeks to review the existing commentary in light of these negotiations so as 
to re-establish which approaches are suitable to the amended DSU. It seeks to address the 
outcomes envisaged by the negotiations and propose changes consistent with these outcomes. 
This article begins at Section II with a brief overview of the purposed outcomes of negotiations 
and the WTO’s tolerance for PTAs. It takes the position that the WTO seeks more political 
freedom and that an isolationist stance will undermine its future legitimacy and efficacy. 
Section III analyses the issues arising out of the WTO’s position and its adjudicatory bodies’ 
treatment of PTAs. It reveals that the use of public international law, including PTAs, is 
unsettled and identifies the gaps and inconsistencies to be addressed. The recent determinations 
from Peru – Agricultural Products pose strong ramifications to the former discussions.5 
Section IV addresses this case separately to account for its significant overlap in its reasoning 
across the various issues raised by this article and the evolving jurisprudence of the earlier 
cases. It goes on to critique the existing proposals to the DSU with particular reference to the 
current DSU draft and what additional proposals should be made.  
 
II Purpose of Negotiations 
 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration established that changes be made to the DSU.6 Interestingly 
DSU negotiations are not part of the single undertaking and so the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
offers the unique opportunity for the DSU to best reflect the consensual intentions of the WTO 
members without concession to other negotiated items.7 The issue of uncertainty regarding 
WTO and PTA conflicts has been recognised and the subject of WTO discussion before.8 
However, the issue is conspicuously absent from DSU negotiations. Instead, negotiations have 
addressed other topics including guidance for panel interpretation, confidentiality, 
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transparency and developing countries.9 Indirectly, amendments under these topics will alter 
future approaches taken in response to PTAs. In particular, guidance for panel interpretation, 
which addresses the use of public international law in WTO disputes, stands out.10 But, in the 
absence of express clarification through negotiations, amendments to the DSU may have both 
intended and unintended consequences to the prevailing issues. 
 
DSU negotiations then represent an important opportunity and responsibility for Members to 
strengthen the institutional foundations of the WTO by fulfilling the Ministerial mandate to 
improve the clarity of the DSU. 11 Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto saw them as coming under 
three general headings: 12 (i) technical fixes and procedural gaps, (ii) access to the system and 
effective recourse to dispute settlement; and, (iii) the balance between independent adjudicators 
and the role of Members. He suggests that these issues are complementary to each other and 
positive changes to one will have holistically positive effects on the others. These changes aim 
to ensure that WTO dispute settlement can continue to serve Members effectively and 
contribute to the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system in the future.13 
An important part of this article is to identify solutions that are agreeable, reflecting the 
intentions of the negotiating Members and workable in practice.14 These solutions should reach 
a balanced convergence on a ‘do no harm’ basis, limited to ‘improvements and clarifications’ 
as necessary to meet the targets of efficiency, without trade-offs that some Members would 
consider detrimental to the functioning of the system.15 Understanding these objectives will 
facilitate satisfactory changes to the DSU as well as aid adjudicatory bodies in their 
interpretation of the law, including PTAs. 
 
There is significant commentary addressing the WTO’s desire for further legal and political 
power and the balance between the judicial and legislative branches.16 Conclusions show that 
it is increased political power that WTO Members currently call for.17 Much of the criticism 
for the current DSU suggests that the judiciary has overstepped and that it has departed into a 
body of law marking, subverting the democratic processes of the WTO.18 The instability of 
ineffective law making has led panels and the Appellate Body to move beyond mere 
interpretation and engage in ‘gap-filling’.19 Indeed, as shown in the negotiations, guidance by 
political legislators to adjudicators over how they ought to be ruling to prevent judicial 
activism, moves to facilitate mutually agreed solutions outside of judicial proceedings, 
increased transparency and third party rights, all suggest a purpose to bolster the political power 
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with PTAs in the WTO: Falling through the Cracks between ‘Judicialization’ and ‘Legalization’” (2015) 14(1) 
WTR 107; Joost Pauwelyn “The Transformation of World Trade” (2005) 104(1) Mich L Rev 1. 
17 Pauwelyn “The Transformation of World Trade”, above n 16. 
18 Clause E Barfield "Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization" (2001) 
2(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 403; William J Davey “The WTO and Rules-Based Dispute Settlement: 
Historical Evolution, Operational Success, and Future Challenges” (2014) 17 J Int’l Econ L 679. 
19 This has been a key concern during negotiations, see for example TN/DS/26 at [258]-[266] and [316]-[318]. 
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of the DSU.20 More generally, the appetite for more political power is apparent in light of the 
stagnating Doha Round. Deepening regionalism and institutionalism has been undertaken by 
states in order to facilitate greater political flexibility. While the WTO is limited by consensus 
at a multilateral scale, PTAs release states from the burden of negotiating with numerous states, 
as well as providing a choice of whom they wish to negotiate. The latter has been a cause for 
concern that the WTO’s position may be undermined by PTAs and new institutions allowing 
states ‘efficient breach’ by disregarding multilateral obligations in favour of others.21 Political 
power enforced through PTAs is decentralised from the WTO and so fails to maintain the 
necessary checks that a multilateral regime sought to create in the first instance – namely, 
controlled liberalisation, protection and equal sovereignty for developed and developing 
countries alike. This is not to say that regionalism cannot be complementary to the multilateral 
regime, but this evolution will require the WTO to control and capture these benefits and not 
lead to a case of the tail wagging the dog. Moreover, in a complex and globalising world, 
different institutions and networks can provide necessary speed, flexibility and context-based 
decision making tailored to specific problems.22 Given the mandate’s requirements to be 
‘realistic’ and ‘workable’, it would be a step too far to block the advancements made under 
PTAs.23  
 
For the WTO to maintain its legitimacy and acceptance as a multilateral regime, Members need 
to believe that it properly respects their individual and collective concerns. The WTO must 
consider if its position in acting as a supreme law maker and preventing adjudicatory bodies 
from adequately addressing PTAs alters its legitimacy in international trade. The proliferation 
of PTAs partly reflects the stagnation of the multilateral regime and its inability to advance 
negotiations.24 If the WTO cannot meet the needs of its Members and simultaneously blocks 
its external advancements, it will quickly lose its relevance. It is, therefore, not enough to 
merely look at the DSU in isolation. The WTO must clarify the judicial approach to PTAs and 
how PTAs are to be treated within the international trade environment more generally. Thus, it 
begs the question, where can flexibility in the DSU work in favour of PTAs and where should 
it be limited? This article submits that flexibility must be built into the system in regards to 
specialised issues or matters which pose minimal concern and detriment to the multilateral 
regime’s membership as a whole. Surely PTAs were constructed in the first place to cover 
matters not properly addressed or reflected by the WTO. This flexibility then is limited by the 
underlying principles that the WTO was established to protect. Overlaps by PTAs merely 
seeking to introduce lesser standards to undermine multilateral obligations must surely be 
repugnant to the compliance WTO members consented to be bound to. What must be 
established then is; what are the WTO’s essential minimum standards and when can 
adjudicatory bodies give effect to PTAs? 
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10-12 September 2007). 
24 Kent Jones Reconstructing the World Trade Organization for the 21st Century: An Institutional Approach 
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III Problems and Treatment of Preferential Trade Agreements in the World Trade 
Organization 
 
This section focuses more deeply on the issues related to and arising from the current WTO 
regime and PTA proliferation. It seeks to analyse what standards panels and the Appellate Body 
have set to date in regards to PTAs, whether these appropriately reflect the level of compliance 
necessary for the WTO and how earlier commentary has sought to address these issues. It 
intends to uncover any gaps created or inconsistencies which remain unresolved that should be 
the focus of negotiations. Notwithstanding approaches to limit or control the formation of 
PTAs, this article seeks only to address measures through the DSU, outside of the single 
undertaking, targeting how PTAs may be used to resolve initiated disputes.25  
 
A Key Issues 
 
With a goal to foster the effectiveness and efficiency of the dispute settlement system, it is 
important to appreciate how changes to the DSU and in regards to PTAs will influence the 
entire regime. Such proposals must resolve weaknesses in the system while also not being 
incompatible with its other future objectives. Regard must be given to issues arising out of 
PTA-WTO conflicts as well as issues entirely internal to the WTO itself.  
 
The first major issue with PTAs concerns jurisdictional conflict. Regional proliferation and 
new institutions grant complainants the opportunity to engage in forum shopping.26 Of 
particular concern is that PTAs threaten to disrupt negotiated multilateral obligations, and as 
more power-based structures, give greater advantage particularly to larger political and 
economic powers at the expense of developing countries, whose WTO protections are 
undermined by external bodies with lesser standards. In order to manage this risk, the DSB 
may insist on compulsory jurisdiction to hear all matters related to the covered agreements, 
even when a similar issue has been heard by another body. This multiplication of procedures 
may create two problems. First, there is a doubling of resources where claims need to be heard 
twice; this is particularly disadvantageous to developing countries whose accessibility is 
limited by their constrained resources.27 Secondly, there is the possibility that matters will be 
decided differently in the different forums and is detrimental to certainty.28 The overlap of 
rights and obligations created by external PTAs brings question to how existing or subsequently 
concluded agreements alter the interpretation or application of WTO and non-WTO law. A 
concern is that giving effect to non-WTO law may alter the rights and obligations of covered 
agreements without the full consensus of WTO Members.29 There remains apprehension that 
                                                      
25 For other examples; use of the enabling clause, Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, or use of the transparency 
mechanism. See Mavroidis “Dealing with PTAs” above n 16; Sherzod Shadikhodjaev “Checking RTA 
Compatibility with Global Trade Rules: WTO Litigation Practice and Implications from the Transparency 
Mechanism for RTAs” (2011) 45(3) J World Trade 529; Armand CM de Mestral “Dispute Settlement Under the 
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1867 UNTS 187 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
26 Busch, above n 21. 
27 Alschner, above n 1; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann “Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, Fragmentation, 
And Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International Trade” (2006) 27 University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of International Economic Law 273. 
28 Alschner, above n 1; Hillman, above n 3 at 202; Joost Pauwelyn and Luiz Eduardo Salles “Forum Shopping 
Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions” (2009) 42 Cornell Int’l L J 77. 
29 Joost Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003); Julien Chaisse and Mitsuo Matsushita 
“Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy in the International Trade Order: A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role 
of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism” (2013) 16(1) J Int’l Econ L 9. 
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the international trade environment and the two modes of agreements – by moving further away 
from each other – will undermine efficiency in trade. The WTO and PTAs must encourage 
participation in a constructive manner while also maintaining the necessary levels of 
compliance.  
 
Internal to the WTO, there are some features that have pertinence when addressing how the 
roles of the WTO and PTAs should be distributed. First, the number of claims that the DSB 
faces is growing significantly.30 Additional work for each case from DSU amendments such as 
strictly confidential information and third party rights will only further this burden. In its 
Annual Report for 2014, the Appellate Body noted that two thirds of cases end up appealed.31 
At the time of the report, if the WTO shut its doors to new claims, there would be enough work 
to keep the panels, Appellate Body and Secretariat staff busy for the next two years.32 The 
number of appeals is not surprising; due to the limitations of negotiations at such a large scale, 
the WTO agreements and the DSU are often silent, whether unintendedly, to embody 
constructive ambiguity, or merely as a means to disagree and continue negotiations on the issue 
at a later date.33 It leaves much to be desired for certainty; yet, adjudicators must still interpret 
and deal with them appropriately and bring a positive solution to a dispute.34 Indeed, what 
drives the extensive use of the dispute settlement system is not so much the need to enforce 
unambiguous obligations under a certain WTO agreement but the existence of contractual 
silence on issues or ambiguous wording that creates different expectations as to the 
interpretation of the contract.35 Silences require adjudicators to use their own judgement to 
make interpretations and, without proper guidance, encourages gap-filling.36 The problem for 
the WTO is that reports are automatically adopted and so legislators have little control to act 
as a check on wrongful determinations. Furthermore, the slow progress of a consensus 
approach to amendments means that provisions are rarely updated. Without a dynamic 
approach to update interpretations and fill necessary gaps, the WTO agreements are unable to 
remain contemporary and will push states to negotiate their own extraneous agreements to 
cover such matters, distancing themselves from the multilateral regime. More direct to the issue 
of workload, the DSB must preserve its ability to effectively resolve disputes and avoid a 
backlog of claims to facilitate timeliness as well as not overstretch its staff to maintain quality 
in its work. It is worthwhile considering the selection and scope of claims it is to receive. There 
is little point to expending resources to hear claims that have already been or are better 
addressed by external forums. In this way, PTAs can help to relieve some of the strain of 
workload burdening the DSB. The WTO should consider whether some claims are better suited 
to external institutions that were specifically tailored to the requirements of its parties. Changes 
within the WTO and DSU ought to reflect the needs of its members to continue as an effective 
dispute settlement system.  
 
 
                                                      
30 TN/DS/27 at [3.61]; Appellate Body Annual Report for 2014 WT/AB/24, 3 July 2015. 
31 WT/AB/24, above n 30 at 6. 
32 At 6. 
33 Giovanni Maggi and Robert W Staiger “On the Role and Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in 
International Trade Agreements” (June 2008) The National Bureau of Economic Research <www.nber.org>. 
34 TN/DS/25 at A-28-A30; DSU, art3(4). 
35 Thomas Bernauer, Manfred Elsig and Joost Pauwelyn “Dispute Settlement Mechanism – Analysis and 
Problems” in The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford University Press, New York, 2012) 
565.   
36 Mitsuo Matsushita “The Dispute Settlement Mechanism at the WTO: The Appellate Body – Assessment and 
Problems” in Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton and Robert M Stern (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the World 
Trade Organization (Oxford University Press, New York, 2012) 507. 
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B Current Approach to Preferential Trade Agreements under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding 
 
The DSU does not establish a court of general jurisdiction.37 The DSU mandate is quite clear 
in this respect; stating that the DSU applies only to the covered agreements listed in Appendix 
1, preserving the rights and obligations under those covered agreements, as well as being the 
required terms of reference that a panel is to make such findings.38 This position is seen as 
fundamental to preserve the intentions and consensus of the Membership. The Appellate Body 
in Mexico – Soft Drinks stated that there is no basis in the DSU for panels or the Appellate 
Body to adjudicate on non-WTO issues and so could not make a determination on whether the 
United States had breached its obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).39 While these provisions are quite clear, the DSU – the result of wide and deep 
negotiation – is also plagued with areas of silence. The questions of what are the limits of the 
application and reference to non-WTO law remain areas of significant debate.40 These issues 
are discussed below and reflect headings within the Consolidated Draft Legal Text under 
negotiation in the proposed Guidance for WTO Adjudicative Bodies:41 (i) the use of public 
international law; and, (ii) the interpretive approach to use in WTO dispute settlement. The 
first heading addresses if other principles and sources of international law can be applied to 
disputes under the DSU and, if so, how they may be. It further analyses whether panels should 
give effect to the dispute mechanisms provisions of external regional agreements such as 
forum-choice clauses and whether WTO panels may apply limitations to jurisdiction or relief. 
The second heading looks to how WTO dispute bodies should interpret rights and obligations 
under the covered agreements in respect to existing PTAs, and whether such agreements vary 
how they are to be applied. It goes on to discuss how silences in the DSU have been interpreted 
and whether dispute bodies are properly abiding to their mandate of interpretation or if they 
are overstepping into the realm of law making and ‘gap-filling’. 
 
1 The Use of Public International Law 
 
The WTO agreements, including the DSU, form part of the body of public international law. 
They, together with other legal sources such as treaties, general principles and customary law, 
make up the legal acquis for international law. It is fundamental to understand what the DSU’s 
place is in this acquis and, thus, how it interacts with the Members’ rights and obligations under 
other international law.42 Harmonisation and a confluence of the different streams can align 
these rights and obligations to build certainty and facilitate efficacy in international trade.43  
                                                      
37 Joel P Trachtman “The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution” (1999) 40 Harv Int’l LJ 333. 
38 DSU, articles 1, 3(2), 7, 11, 19(2) and 23. 
39 Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages WT/DS308/AB/R, 6 March 2006 (Report of the 
Appellate Body) at [56]. 
40 Gabrielle Marceau “Fragmentation in International Law: The Relationship between WTO Law and General 
International Law – a Few Comments from a WTO Perspective” (2006) 17 Finnish Yearbook of International 
Law 5; Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau “Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the WTO and RTAs” 
(paper presented at World Trade Organization Conference on Regional Trade Agreements, April 2002); Pauwelyn 
Conflict of Norms, above n 29; Joost Pauwelyn “The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can 
We Go?” (2001) 95 AJIL 535. 
41 TN/DS/25 at A-27. 
42 Pauwelyn “How Far Can We Go?”, above n 40. 
43 For some examples of proposed methods, see Mitsuo Matsushita “A View on Future Roles of The WTO: Should 
There Be More Soft Law in The WTO?” (2014) 17 J Int’l Econ L 701; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann “Need for a New 
Philosophy of International Economic Law and Adjudication” (2014) 17 J Int’l Econ L 639; Alschner, above n 1; 
William J Davey and Andre Sapir “The Soft Drinks Case: The WTO and Regional Agreements” (2009) 8(1) WTR 
5; Henry Gao and Chin Leng Lim “Saving the WTO from the Risk of Irrelevance: the WTO Dispute Settlement 
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However, despite calls for harmonisation, there is also support for fragmentation as far as the 
WTO retains its exclusive position.44 Advocates for fragmentation argue that the covered 
agreements represent a consensus negotiated by the Membership and that external law 
undermines the will of the parties to the treaty.45  
 
On the matter of jurisdictional overlap with outside agreements, WTO adjudicatory bodies have 
tended to uphold their jurisdiction to hear a claim.46 Many PTAs contain ‘forum choice’ 
provisions on how to proceed with dispute resolution. The most common is to allow the 
complainant to choose to proceed either under the WTO or the PTA.47 This type of situation 
arose in Argentina – Poultry, where Brazil initiated a dispute under the WTO after an 
unsuccessful claim under Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur).48 The panel stated that this 
choice did not amount to a waiver or preclude Brazil from invoking its WTO settlement rights 
under the DSU.49 Unfortunately, the panel did not address the applicability of the apparent 
‘forum exclusion’ as it was not yet in force at the time of the dispute.50 Even if such forum 
exclusion provision was in force, panels still appear reluctant to give effect to them. The 
Appellate Body in Mexico – Soft Drinks took the position set in Canada – Aircraft that Article 
11 of the DSU mandates a duty to make an objective assessment of the facts in order to assist 
the DSB by making recommendations and rulings on the covered agreements.51 A denial of 
jurisdiction would infringe on a WTO Member’s right under Article 23 of the DSU, which 
provides that they shall have recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU. Disallowing a 
validly established jurisdiction would be inconsistent with a panel’s requirement not to 
diminish the rights of a Member under Article 3(2) of the DSU.52 The conclusion is that any 
claims properly brought under the covered agreements will receive compulsory jurisdiction 
and an automatic right to be heard, even in the face of prior or subsequent forum choice 
agreements or proceedings concluded by the parties.53 In the face of overlap, the WTO will 
have jurisdiction over any WTO rules; only WTO+ rules outside of the scope of the covered 
agreements will lack the necessary requirements to establish jurisdiction for a panel. From a 
logical standpoint, this creates a self-enforcing mechanism where parties recognise that, in 
order to protect the finality of decisions and prevent the doubling of costs, complainants will 
naturally bring all WTO related claims under the DSU and restrict the use of WTO+ rules 
negotiated in their agreements to their external forum. For instance, in US – Tuna II, even 
though the United States requested Mexico to engage in consultations under NAFTA believing 
                                                      
Mechanism as a ‘Common Good’ for RTA Disputes” (2008) 11 J Int’l Econ L 899; Joost Pauwelyn “Legal 
Avenues to “Multilateralizing Regionalism”: Beyond article XXIV” (paper presented at the Conference on 
Multilateralising Regionalism, Geneva, Switzerland, 10-12 September 2007); de Mestral, above n 25. 
44 Trachtman, above n 37; Sheela Rai “WTO Dispute Settlement System and Democracy” (2014) 13(2) J Int’l 
Trade L and Pol’y 185. 
45 Kwak, above n 40; Trachtman, above n 37. 
46 In particular, these questions of jurisdictional overlap relate to ‘choice of forum’ and ‘forum exclusion’. These 
respectively refer to what forum should have jurisdiction over a matter when there are competing alternatives, and 
the potential of barring additional proceedings when a matter has already been undertaken by another dispute 
resolution avenue. 
47 Hillman, above n 3. 
48 Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil WT/DS241/R, 19 May 2003 (Report of the 
Panel). 
49 At [7.38]. 
50 At [7.38]. The Protocol of Olivos, provides that once a party brings a claim in either Mercosur or WTO dispute 
settlement, that party may not bring the same dispute to another forum. 
51 Mexico – Soft Drinks WT/DS308/AB/R, above n 39 at [51]; Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft WT/DS70/AB/R, 2 August 1999 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [187]. 
52 Mexico – Soft Drinks WT/DS308/AB/R, above n 39 at [52]-[53]; DSU, arts 3(2) and 19(2). 
53 At [54]. While a panel cannot refuse jurisdiction, note that a claim must first be validly established (emphasis 
added). It is left open that there may be the possibility of legal impediments to jurisdiction. 
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this would be the most appropriate forum, it did not invoke its exclusive forum choice clause 
after Mexico had already established a WTO panel.54 This may be a factor explaining why the 
issue of jurisdictional conflict does not arise as a matter for dispute as often as one might expect 
given the proliferation of PTAs. However, is such compliance to the WTO forum out of 
reluctance or desire? Surely, it would be wrong to suggest that states negotiated and continue 
to negotiate such forum choices and exclusions into their agreements if they did not intend to 
give effect to them or presume them to be binding. The argument goes that WTO adjudicatory 
bodies must maintain compulsory jurisdiction to hear claims as a check on the rule of power.55 
In light of the earlier identified issues, the WTO must realise that there are cases where it need 
not intervene with PTA jurisdiction and should rather shift some of the workload to external 
bodies. The DSB must adapt and shift the principles it seeks to enforce from one of compulsory 
jurisdiction in all cases, to one of assuming jurisdiction only when the situation calls for such 
protection. 
 
Public international law is not limited to agreements concluded by states. Customary 
international law and general principles of law are a significant part of the legal acquis. Many 
commentators suggest that they can be applied to situations of jurisdictional conflict.56 There 
is no doubt that, in some instances, other agreements outside the WTO’s covered agreements 
can be relevant to examine.57 Widely recognised principles of international law may be 
applicable in WTO dispute settlement and reasoning similar to res judicata and estoppel have 
been given effect before. The panel in Korea – Procurement noted that ‘the relationship of the 
WTO agreements to customary international law is broader than simply the rules to 
interpretation.’58 Customary international law applies generally to the extent that parties do not 
‘contract out’ or that it is not inconsistent with the WTO agreements. Nonetheless, 
commentators have demonstrated that the application of such principles appear too narrow in 
the face of jurisdictional overlap.59 The provisions in the DSU and, particularly, Article 23 are 
taken to operate as a means of compulsory jurisdiction whereby a WTO adjudicating body 
always has authority, or even an obligation, to examine claims under the covered agreements.60 
While WTO panels do have competence to consider their own jurisdictional scope over claims 
                                                      
54 United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products 
WT/DS381R, 15 September 2011 (Report of the Panel). 
55 Yong-Shik Lee “Reconciling RTAs with the WTO Multilateral Trading System: Case for a New Sunset 
Requirement on RTAs and Development Facilitation” (2011) 45(3) J World Trade 629. 
56 Kwak, above n 40; Hillman, above n 3; Joost Pauwelyn “Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement 
in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other Jurisdictions” 
(2004) 13(2) Minn J Global Trade 231. 
57 See generally David Palmeter and Petros C Mavroidis Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation: 
Practice and Procedure (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) at 17-84; India – Measures 
Affecting the Automotive Sector WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, 5 April 2002 (Reports of the Panel); European 
Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 
of the DSU by India WT/DS141/RW, 24 April 2003 (Report of the Panel); United States – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Measures on Steel Plate from India WT/DS206/R, 29 July 2002 (Report of the Panel) at 
[7.29]; Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States – 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States WT/DS132/AB/RW, 21 November 2001 (Report of the 
Appellate Body) at [50]. 
58 Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement WT/DS163/R, 19 June 2000 (Report of the Panel) at 
[7.96]. 
59 Gabrielle Marceau and Julian Wyatt “Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled: Regional Trade Agreements 
and the WTO” (2012) 1(1) JIDS 67. 
60 Kwak, above n 40. 
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before it with regards to its mandate and terms of reference, there appears to be no room to 
limit jurisdiction based on non-WTO law sources.61 
 
While the DSU appears to affirm that WTO panels shall always have compulsory jurisdiction 
to hear a case, many commentators contend that the use of public international law; PTAs and 
other principles, may nevertheless be used as evidence in a dispute. Pauwelyn draws a 
distinction between ‘jurisdiction’ and the ‘applicable law’.62 While the DSU mandates 
jurisdiction and finding violations under the covered agreements, it does not preclude 
adjudicatory bodies to make rulings based on the examination of outside law. Thus, WTO 
adjudicatory bodies should exercise a level of comity to consider and apply the reasoning of 
other tribunals to prevent inconsistent rulings and unnecessary re-litigation.63 Furthermore, it 
may be that non-WTO law, though it cannot be the base of a claim under the DSU, may act as 
a justification or defence of a breach of a WTO obligation. In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the 
panel and Appellate Body considered Brazil’s argument that a binding dispute settlement 
decision under Mercosur was justification of an import ban of the same products from WTO 
Members.64 The Appellate Body, though not finding so on the facts, did acknowledge that, in 
appropriate circumstances, the decision of a regional dispute tribunal may provide sufficient 
justification.65 In fact, this circumstantial caveat surfaces in respect of many of the cited 
determinations. The Appellate Body has not entirely closed the book on the use of non-WTO 
law as either a bar on jurisdiction or its application.66 However, the Appellate Body, exercising 
judicial economy, has not answered what these circumstances may be. In respect of these 
determinations, it is difficult to foresee what situation might be sufficient. It is likely such 
caveats on determinations are just to err on the side of caution. 
 
There is an interesting implication from various decisions that where there is inconsistency 
with WTO rules – whether they be customary international law, general principles or 
obligations under PTAs – WTO rules prevails.67 These determinations appear to raise WTO 
law as supreme over non-WTO law. This apparent hierarchy has been picked up by a number 
of commentators who believe that the WTO wrongly assumes this primacy and question the 
WTO’s place in international public law.68 Formally, there is no hierarchy in international 
law.69 However, the DSB’s rigour in upholding WTO law above non-WTO law is an implicit 
elevation, a ‘structural supremacy’ that sets a minimum standard that should bind all Members 
                                                      
61 United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS136/AB/R, 26 September 2000 (Report 
of the Appellate Body) at [52]; United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia WT/DS58/AB/RW, 21 November 2001 (Report of the Appellate 
Body) at [5.56]; de Mestral, above n 25. 
62 Pauwelyn “Multilateralizing Regionalism”, above n 43. 
63 Joost Pauwelyn “Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO—NAFTA ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ is Cooking” 
(2006) 9(1) J Int’l Econ L 197. 
64 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres WT/DS332/R, 12 June 2007 (Report of the Panel) at 
[7.283] 
65 Brazil – Retreaded Tyres WT/DS332/AB/R, above n 64 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [216]-[234]. 
66 Bernauer, above n 35. 
67 Korea – Procurement WT/DS163/R, above n 58 at [7.96]; Mexico – Soft Drinks WT/DS308/AB/R, above n 39; 
Argentina – Poultry WT/DS241/R, above n 48 at [7.40]-[7.41]; Donald McRae “International Economic Law and 
Public International Law: The Past and The Future” (2014) 17 J Int’l Econ L 627. 
68 Pauwelyn “How Far Can We Go?”, above n 40; Pauwelyn “Multilateralizing Regionalism, above n 43; Gregory 
Shaffer and Joel Trachtman “WTO Judicial Interpretation” in Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton and Robert M 
Stern (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford University Press, New York, 2012) 
535; McRae, above n 67; de Mestral, above n 25. 
69 Pauwelyn “How Far Can We Go?”, above n 40. 
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and cannot be waived.70 Supremacy, however, raises a separate issue. International law 
generally sets out a strong presumption against normative conflict and that different agreements 
are to be read consistently with each other.71 WTO decisions show that their determinations 
were reached on the basis of inconsistency or conflict. Yet, former decisions have not expressly 
addressed on what principles this supremacy is based and how they qualify its position. An 
interesting point to mention is that Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 enables the creation of 
PTAs. The mere existence of PTA provisions presumes that they are valid and not 
incompatible.72 In this regard, there is a jurisprudential issue that, although such agreements 
are provided for and valid, they are, at the same time, inconsistent and subordinate.  
 
2 The Interpretive Approach to Use in World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
 
While rights and obligations under non-WTO law have no direct applicability, its use may still 
play a vital role in providing for systemic integration. Article 3(2) of the DSU explicitly 
provides that adjudicators clarify the rights and obligations of the covered agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The first 
question, then, is when and in what circumstances an adjudicatory body may or shall regard 
these rules. Secondly, to what extent can these rules alter the meaning of the rights and 
obligations under the covered agreements to the parties to a dispute and to the WTO 
Membership as a whole. Question remains whether adjudicatory bodies are engaging in gap-
filling (adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements) 
and entering the role of law making, rather than correctly exercising their mandate to interpret 
agreements and respecting the consensus of the Membership.73  
 
Panels and the Appellate Body recognised from the outset that under the customary rules of 
treaty interpretation, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, WTO law is ‘not to be read 
in clinical isolation from public international law’.74 Of particular relevance to the overlap of 
WTO law and PTAs is Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. It outlines that ‘any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ … ‘shall be taken into 
account’.75 The International Law Commission (ILC) reported on the findings of a study group 
addressing the fragmentation of international law.76 The study group concluded that this 
provision was essential to give effect to the principle of ‘systemic integration’ and necessary 
for determinations to be made consistently with the broader international legal environment.77 
However, EC – Biotech and subsequent cases have ruled that ‘applicable in relations between 
the parties’ means that Article 31(1)(c) only triggers when all parties to the treaty under 
                                                      
70 Shaffer, above n 68; Trachtman, above n 37. 
71 Martii Koskenniemi Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law (International Law Commission, 58th Session, Geneva, 1 May to 9 June and 3 
July to 11 August 2006, A/CN4/L682) at [37]. 
72 Songling Yang “The Solution for Jurisdictional Conflicts Between the WTO and RTAs: The Forum Choice 
Clause” (2015) 23(1) Mich St Int'l L Rev 107. 
73 TN/DS/26 at [258]-[266] and [316]-[318]. 
74 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 May 1996 (Report 
of the Appellate Body). 
75 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980), art 31(3)(c). 
76 Koskenniemi, above n 71. 
77 Campbell McLachlan “The Principle of System Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention” 
(2005) 54(2) ICLQ 279. 
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interpretation are also parties to the extraneous treaty.78 Therefore, PTAs, as concluded by a 
subset of the WTO’s membership, cannot be addressed when interpreting the WTO 
agreements. Given the WTO’s extensive membership, such a limitation emphasises the WTO’s 
isolation and fragmentation of international law. The determination appears inconsistent given 
the widely approved approach in US – Gasoline that WTO law should not be read in ‘clinical 
isolation’.79 The approach taken in EC – Biotech is generally referred to as the ‘restrictive’ 
approach and gains its support on the primary basis that it protects non-parties to extraneous 
agreements from its legal consequences.80 That is, it would be wrong that outside agreements 
could affect WTO members’ rights and obligations without their consent. However, the 
meaning of ‘taken into account’ does not necessarily mean the extraneous provision must apply 
as the panel in EC – Biotech suggested in holding a restrictive view.81 The ILC study argued 
that all Article 31(3)(c) requires is the incorporation into legal reasoning of a sense of 
coherence.82 Meanwhile, Pauwelyn makes the distinction between interpretation and 
application. Interpretation is about the determination of content of a treaty and should have one 
uniform interpretation for WTO law; rather it is the application in the circumstances that 
depends on the parties.83 The alternative ‘broad’ approach is that the term ‘parties’ refers only 
to those parties in the dispute and would allow a PTA to be taken into account when interpreting 
WTO rights and obligations.84 The broad approach gained its support from a decision, US – 
Shrimp, where the panel took into account an extraneous treaty that neither the whole WTO 
nor all of the parties to the dispute were party to.85 However, the panel in EC – Biotech noted 
that the panel, in that case, voluntarily drew upon extraneous rules rather than as a question of 
whether Article 31(3)(c) required it to.86 Supporters of the broad approach believe that uniform 
interpretation is not possible.87 In the international legal environment, obligations commonly 
diverge and may do so between parties even under the same agreement.88 It is consensus to 
other agreements that should be equally respected and given effect. Ultimately, both 
interpretations result in some level of fragmentation. The restrictive approach isolates different 
interpretations to different agreements where not all parties are common, whereas the broad 
approach results in obligations under the same agreements being interpreted differently 
depending on the party. There is perhaps a third and overlooked alternative interpretation to 
Article 31(3)(c), however. McGrady suggests that ‘the parties’ refers to parties to the treaty 
under interpretation but the phrase ‘applicable in relations between’ refer to relations between 
the parties to the treaty generally.89 It, therefore, does not mean that the extraneous treaty is 
binding over all parties, but rather concerns whether it is applicable and would not result in 
                                                      
78 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 21 November 2006 (Report of the Panel) at [7.68]–[7.70]; contrast US – Gasoline 
WT/DS2/AB/R, above n 74 at 17. 
79 Benn McGrady “Fragmentation of International Law or “Systemic Integration” of Regimes: EC – Biotech 
Products and the Proper Interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” 
(2008) 42(4) J World Trade 589; Gabrielle Marceau “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights” (2002) 14(4) 
Eur J Int’l L 753. 
80 Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms, above n 29; McLachlan, above n 77; see also Margaret Young “The WTO’s Use 
of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the Biotech Case” (2007) 56(October) ICLQ 907. 
81 EC - Biotech WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, above n 78 at [7.69]. 
82 Koskenniemi, above n 71 at [419]. 
83 Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms, above n 29; Pauwelyn “Multilaterizaling Regionalism”, above n 43. 
84 McGrady, above n 79. 
85 EC - Biotech WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, above n 78 at [7.52]. 
86 At [7.94]. 
87 Duncan French “Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules” (2006) 55(2) ICLQ 
281. 
88 See also Koskenniemi, above n 71. 
89 McGrady, above n 79. 
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divergence and fragmentation.90 It would make sense to apply the approach that results in the 
greatest consistency to respect both WTO and PTA obligations. We further build on this third 
interpretation in Section IV when discussing the interpretive approach to use in WTO dispute 
settlement. Indeed, while this type of approach has not been applied yet, there does at least 
appear to be acknowledgment by the Appellate Body that a restrictive approach is 
inappropriate. In EC – Aircraft, the Appellate Body suggested that ‘a delicate balance must be 
struck between, on the one hand, taking due account of an individual WTO Member’s 
international obligations and, on the other hand, ensuring a consistent and harmonious 
approach to the interpretation of WTO law among all WTO members’.91 
 
Notwithstanding when WTO law may be sufficiently express, there are times when WTO law 
is silent or indeterminable. Could such ambiguities be filled by parties extraneous agreements 
or PTAs and given effect without adding or diminishing the rights and obligations of the 
covered agreements? The underlying clarification for adjudicators that must be made is when 
does interpretation become gap-filling. The distinction is often subtle. An example of the 
panel’s approach to silence can be seen in US – Shrimp which considered whether panels and 
the Appellate Body can accept amicus briefs from persons other than the disputing parties.92 
The DSU has no provisions covering this, but the Appellate Body ruled that Article 13 of the 
DSU empowered panels to ‘seek’ information from any sources including amicus briefs.93 
There is some criticism around this decision and later panels acknowledge that it should be 
cautious about not making law. Determining the rules is not the responsibility of adjudicatory 
bodies; only WTO members have the authority to amend the DSU or make such 
interpretations.94 In defining the line between interpretation and gap-filling, Trachtman argues 
that there is a distinction between a context that calls for construction and a lacuna.95 
Construction is allowed where the intention of the parties is determinable, whereas a lacuna is 
a situation where the intent is not known.96 If this approach is supported, then it is up to the 
WTO to better clarify the intention of such ambiguities so that it is not left to the discretion of 
panels to decide. A major drawback to this approach is how panels should address a situation 
of a genuine lacuna. Accordingly, if adjudicators adhere strictly to Article 3(2) of the DSU, 
then it would have no choice but to rule in default.97 Such an approach again reflects the 
isolation WTO law seems to take. This position flies in the face of conventional theory which 
presumes there can be no lacunae in international law and that public international law fills 
such gaps.98 It is necessary for the WTO to properly address how such silences should be 
addressed and whether it is preferable to allow adjudicators flexibility to develop them such as 
by reference to PTAs.  
 
                                                      
90 McGrady, above n 79. 
91 European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft WT/DS316/AB/R, 18 May 2011 
(Report of the Appellate Body) at [845]; see also, EC – Biotech Products WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, 
WT/DS293/R, above n 78 at [7.72]. 
92 United States – Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998 
(Report of the Appellate Body). 
93 US – Shrimp WT/DS58/AB/R, above n 92 at [104]; Matsushita “The Dispute Settlement Mechanism”, above n 
36. 
94 United States – Import Measure on Certain Products from the European Communities WT/DS165/AB/R, 11 
December 2000 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [92]. 
95 Trachtman, above n 37. 
96 At 339. 
97 At 336. 
98 Prosper Weil ““The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively …” Non Liquet Revisited” (1997) 36 Colum J 
Transnat’l L 109.at 110; Pauwelyn “How Far Can We Go?”, above n 40. 
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IV Addressing the Issues 
 
Negotiations should now focus on clarifying or rethinking its position in light of the main issues 
and inconsistencies identified in Section III. Current proposals have aimed to address 
procedural issues that have given rise to litigation.99 However, the DSB should be careful not 
to simply confirm Appellate Body decisions to date given the cautious approach, use of judicial 
economy exercised and further evidence that they may actually be contrary to the intended 
objectives of the Membership. Where possible, it should also seek to provide answers to the 
questions that adjudicators have not yet addressed. Negotiations have recognised that 
multilateral clarification of such issues may enhance efficiency by avoiding unnecessary 
uncertainty and litigation of procedural issues.100 While the current draft does not explicitly 
refer to the issue of PTAs, this article identifies ‘Additional Guidance for WTO Adjudicative 
Bodies’ within the draft DSU as particularly important. This section will focus on those 
amendments and follow the same order outlined in Section III. Regard is also given to the 
DSB’s general considerations to negotiations and the purposes identified in Section II.101 As a 
preliminary matter, it will first address Peru – Agricultural Products and analyse how the 
previous issues have evolved, the extent they provide for further answers, as well as address 
commentary made by others on the dispute. We do not intend to resolve whether the Appellate 
Body was correct in its decisions, but attempt to find consistency and support to its logic for 
the purpose of understanding its position. Subsequently to this section, we consider whether its 
direction appropriately reflects the intentions of the WTO membership and should be expressed 
in the DSU amendments.102 
 
A Peru – Agricultural Products 
 
Two important questions that the Appellate Body’s reasoning addressed were (i) whether a 
PTA be used in order remove a member’s right to a WTO panel, and (ii) whether WTO law 
can be modified or influenced by PTA provisions. The reasoning of the Appellate Body, if 
correct, appears to make grand claims about the structural supremacy for the WTO over other 
international law. 
Despite staunch opposition to limit DSB jurisdiction, Mexico – Soft Drinks and Peru – 
Agricultural Products, accept that there may be ‘circumstances in which legal impediments 
could exist that would preclude a panel from ruling on the merits of the claims that are before 
it.’103 Natens and Descheemaeker argue that a breach of good faith in Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of 
the DSU would prevent jurisdiction from being validly established.104 The Appellate Body 
relied on EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5) and expressed that parties may waive their rights 
outside of mutually agreed solutions, but that a member cannot fail to act in good faith unless 
                                                      
99 TN/DS/27 at [2.5]. 
100 At [2.5]. 
101 TN/DS/25 at A-2, General considerations in negotiations: (a) limit any drafting changes to what is necessary 
to achieve the intended purpose and take into consideration the drafting guidelines suggested by several 
participants to ensure the greatest level of clarity possible (b) ensure that drafting consistency is maintained 
throughout the DSU (including internal consistency between unchanged existing DSU text and proposed new or 
amended text) (c) bear in mind the procedural coherence of the system (ensuring that intended clarifications or 
improvements are not an inadvertent source of further procedural complexities or uncertainties). 
102 We note that the Peru – Agricultural Products was settled subsequent to the negotiation materials relied on for 
this article and so Members did not have the benefit of addressing the Appellate Body’s reasoning. 
103 Mexico – Soft Drinks WT/DS/308/AB/R, above n 39 at [54]; Peru – Agricultural Products WT/DS457/AB/R, 
above n 5 at [5.25]–[5.28]. 
104 Bregt Natens & Sidonie Descheemaeker “Say It Loud, Say It Clear: Article 3.10 DSU’s Clear Statement Test 
as a Legal Impediment to Validly Established Jurisdiction” (2015) 49(5) JWT 873. 
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it had ‘clearly stated that it would not take legal action with respect to a certain measure’.105 
Without an intentional, clear and unambiguous statement, a member does not relinquish its 
rights to the WTO dispute settlement system.106 Natens and Descheemaeker suggest that an 
exercised fork-in-the-road, forum exclusion provision would violate good faith if the party 
subsequently brings the case to the WTO. We concur that a lack of good faith could act as a 
legal impediment; however, remain sceptical of whether an exercised forum exclusion would 
amount to a clear statement. Good faith is ‘ascertained on the basis of actions taken in relation 
to, or within the context of, the rules and procedures of the DSU’.107 We believe that similar 
limitations exist as with an argument of res judicata and lis pendens. These principles fail to 
apply for the reason that a ‘legal claim’ under the WTO covered agreements is necessarily 
different from one arising out of the parties’ bilateral obligations. Note that footnote 106 of the 
Appellate Body decision maintains that waiver must not relinquish member’s rights and 
obligations under the DSU beyond the settlement of specific disputes.108 This narrow reading 
could support that the WTO is concerned with specific legal claims rather than a broadly 
defined subject matter. An exercised forum exclusion would relate to the same ‘subject matter’, 
but would not strictly waive the ‘legal claim’ necessary to interfere with the procedural good 
faith granted under the DSU. This may give better insight to the apparent acceptance of 
understandings within the WTO context.109 Notwithstanding the arguments of the WTO giving 
greater regard to its own jurisprudence, the ‘Understanding on Bananas’, because it was 
concluded in the WTO context, naturally related to a waiver of a WTO legal claim.110 This may 
be the crucial aspect, but even then, there is no reason such waiver could not be made at a 
bilateral level if properly expressed. Pauwelyn outlines that a PTA to shut out a WTO dispute 
would need to (i) clearly stipulate so, (ii) make an explicit reference to the DSU, and (iii) limit 
the waiver to ‘specific disputes’.111 To this end, we add that the nature of this waiver must 
properly address the legal claim of the dispute. It must further be noted that there is still no 
certainty as to how these arguments would be treated if tested in a non-WTO context such as 
through a PTA. As an alternate means of argument, Pauwelyn again draws the distinction 
between application and jurisdiction. He posits that consent provided by Article 20 of the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility would offer a substantive means of defence and reduce the 
issues to a factual inquiry.112 However, application of non-WTO law in a substantive manner 
still appears uncertain and it becomes a question of whether the WTO’s legal acquis allows or 
has endorsed it, or whether WTO law has set it aside as a hierarchal constraint.  
The more astonishing judgments then perhaps come in regards to the Appellate Body’s 
treatment of non-WTO law and a near confirmation of its own supremacy. It ruled that the 
specific WTO provisions, and in particular Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 prevail over the 
                                                      
105 EC – Bananas III (2nd Recourse to Article 21.5) WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, 26 
November 2008 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [217] and [228]. 
106 Peru – Agricultural Products WT/DS457/AB/R, above n 5 at [5.28]. 
107 At [5.25]. 
108 At [5.26]. 
109 Others have suggested that a distinction based on context is arbitrary. See Joost Pauwelyn “Interplay Between 
the WTO Treaty and Other International Legal Instruments and Tribunals: Evolution after 20 Years of WTO 
Jurisprudence” (10 February 2016) <papers.ssrn.com>; Akhil Raina “’The Day the Music Died’: The Curious 
Case of Peru – Agricultural Products” (2016) 11(2) Global Trade and Customs Journal 71. 
110 Understanding on Bananas between the European Communities and the United States signed on 11 April 2001 
(WT/DS27/59, G/C/W/270; WT/DS27/58, Enclosure 1); Understanding on Bananas between the European 
Communities and Ecuador signed on 30 April 2001 (WT/DS27/60, G/C/W/274; WT/DS27/58, Enclosure 2). 
111 Pauwelyn “Interplay Between the WTO Treaty”, above n 109. 
112 Pauwelyn also argues that Article 45 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility could be used to support a 
defence that Guatemala could no longer invoke responsibility to support a bar on proceedings.  
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general provisions of the Vienna Convention such as Article 41 on inter se modification.113 
This formulation may presume that WTO provisions are lex specialis. Many take offence to 
this finding and suggest that the Appellate Body improperly interpreted the WTO provisions, 
arguing that Article 41 and Article XXIV cover different situations.114 However, lex specialis 
need not apply in such a traditional sense, and indeed, closed regimes like the WTO may be 
sui generis with regard to its treatment of general international law principles.115 General law, 
of which Article 41 is part of, may be set aside merely on the basis that WTO law gives no 
textual basis to apply it.116 Still, something must be said to address the expectation that 
international law is to be used to fill-gaps. Even if Article 41 has no textual applicability, unless 
it can be shown that the WTO agreements cover or sought to overrule its residual application, 
then there should be no restraint on its application.117 Perhaps a stronger basis for WTO law 
prevailing here is that the WTO obligations in question are of a collective nature, affecting all 
WTO members simultaneously. Therefore, any sort of waiver or modification between a subset 
of parties would be impossible as it would violate the rights of all Members and be contrary to 
the Treaty’s object and purpose.118 There is debate whether WTO obligations are indeed by 
nature collective or bilateral.119 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body’s reasoning appears to set 
down the argument that it, at least, believes WTO obligations to be characterised as collective 
or interdependent. It characterises the only applicable forms of amendment and waiver to be 
through mechanisms that necessarily involve collective approval or protection.120 In 
referencing Article XXIV, an MFN exception, it takes a narrow view, emphasising that it 
facilitates closer integration and not be exploited to roll back rights and obligations.121 It is 
evidence it believes WTO obligations to be a collective goal to facilitate multilateral 
liberalisation and that any step back from WTO rules would be contrary to the context of the 
WTO’s aims and Members’ rights and obligations. Such interdependent obligations also appear 
evident from adjudicatory bodies’ emphasis to make sure interpretation be uniform across the 
entire Membership.122 If obligations were purely bilateral in nature, then it is our opinion 
divergent interpretations based on the parties to a dispute would not be problematic.  
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The question left standing is to what extent can non-WTO law, including PTAs, be used 
consistently within the WTO regime. An interesting aspect of the Appellate Body’s decision is 
that it appeared to reason Article 41 would apply but for Article XXIV.123 Therefore, if the 
previously stated structural supremacy is correct, then what basis did the Appellate Body have 
in analysing Article 41 in the first place? Bartels distinguishes that there is a difference between 
an application of non-WTO law to determine an issue necessary to apply WTO law and an 
application of non-WTO law to determine whether WTO law can be applied.124 Here, it appears 
the Appellate Body has considered Article 41 only as to express that the WTO law in Article 
XXIV is applicable to all forms of modification. It articulated how existing WTO law applies 
inter se and to express why as a collective obligation, Article XXIV must be interpreted 
narrowly and consistently. The limit then of non-WTO law is it may be used so far as it does 
not modify the WTO provisions or their contextual object and purpose. Indeed, we have seen 
WTO adjudicatory bodies relying on non-WTO law for building its own procedures or as 
reasoning to endogenously develop interpretations within the WTO regime.125 Putting these 
factors together, it would suggest that the application of non-WTO law is limited except 
perhaps in situations where the obligations can properly be interpreted as having a bilateral 
nature such as for procedural matters between disputing parties. Indeed, procedural waivers in 
regard to jurisdiction appear more palatable as it can be expressed through Articles 3.7 and 
3.10 of the DSU. This outcome would put the WTO in a precariously powerful position over 
other international law. For the purposes of Peru – Agricultural Products, it seems to shut the 
book on any form of substantive waiver or modification outside of those incorporated within 
WTO Law such as Article XXIV. PTAs then, compared to other non-WTO law, actually 
receive benefit in the regime as they are expressly given reference by the GATT 1994 as a 
means of deviation. This would resolve to address the apparent jurisprudential subordination 
of PTAs earlier identified. With regards to the possibility then for WTO-minus rules to be 
formed, this would depend on how much slack Article XXIV provides.126 We leave critique of 
the current approach to Article XXIV to others; but, the Appellate Body’s ruling here suggests 
deviation will only exist to allow WTO+ rules unless they are ‘necessary’ to the PTA’s 
formation.127  
 
B Guidance to Adjudicators 
 
The intention of providing guidance on the use and interpretation of public international law is 
for the DSB to adopt such guidelines in a decision that would not have the legal status of treaty 
text.128 Consideration was given to the following aspects: the relevance of non-WTO law and 
if the guidelines intend to modify or confirm existing practice; whether other interpretative 
approaches are implied outside those prescribed by Article 3(2) DSU and how constructive 
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ambiguity and gap-filling is distinguished from the legitimate application of customary 
international law.129 Negotiations have leaned towards a ‘principles-based approach’ to provide 
guidance rather than on the basis of examples only.130 While a principles-based approach is 
likely preferable when addressing international law generally, this article suggests that PTAs 
need specific acknowledgment to mirror their prominence in international trade.  
 
1 The Use of Public International Law 
 
Judicial treatment shows how the WTO and DSB have assumed a level of supremacy, 
preventing non-WTO law from applying to WTO rules. The draft readily identifies that the 
WTO agreements are part of public international law and that other public international law 
can play an important role in WTO dispute settlement.131 Yet, this provides no certainty to what 
extent non-WTO law may be applied to a dispute. If one is to assume the WTO’s de facto 
supremacy, then only if reference to and applicability of non-WTO law is codified in its own 
text will it be effective without diminishing Member’s rights.132 The concern for collective 
obligations suggests that flexibility may be appropriate in situations that other Members are 
not materially affected and have no legal claim. However, unease that outside institutions might 
threaten the purpose of facilitating multilateralism should be relaxed; this article submitting 
that blocking other institutions and law would in fact pose a greater threat to the multilateral 
regime. 
 
In assessing jurisdiction, the ‘jurisdictional impediment’ approach cases allude to appears too 
strict. A number of commentators have suggested that the WTO incorporate its own forum 
choice into its text to give effect to a complainant’s choice.133 Any amendment giving effect to 
forum choice then must be complemented by an exclusion clause in the DSU to prevent further 
claims solely on the same ‘subject matter’ and remove the difficult requirement of ‘legal claim’ 
needed in light of Peru – Agricultural Products and as a general principle approach. However, 
it is clear Members believe it would be inappropriate to allow all matters to be moved outside 
the WTO. The WTO should allow other forums to settle disputes only in situations that would 
not materially undermine compliance of essential principles. Assessing these situations is 
difficult and this article posits two mitigating approaches. The first would be to set a hard limit; 
where a developing country is involved, it would have the determining choice of which forum 
it may use. This will make sure that their protections are not undermined by any power-based 
PTAs that they get pulled into. In the case of two developing countries, there could be a 
presumption of the WTO unless agreed otherwise. The second approach would be to expand 
on a panel’s competence to rule on its own jurisdiction. Under this approach, the panel could 
analyse the risk of harm of external proceedings and then decide to either give effect and refer 
to an outside institution or insist on its jurisdiction. This approach would involve more work 
than the first but would give the WTO greater control over what disputes go through the system. 
For any option seeking to move claims away from the DSB, one must recognise that it is not 
simply the parties to the dispute which have an interest. The DSU, of course, maintains third 
party rights and is now further seeking to promote transparency and access.134 Movement 
outside of the WTO will diminish these rights (though not strictly if forum choice is textually 
allowed) unless PTAs coordinate to offer the same rights. In this respect, the second alternative 
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may provide a better solution to allow third parties to put their interest forward when analysing 
whether a panel should insist on jurisdiction, rather than leaving the choice up to the disputing 
parties. Thus, it would better allow for determination on whether the matter threatens collective 
obligations. 
 
On the matter of the application of general principles of law, it was stated trying to codify 
generally uncontroversial notions may also introduce unwanted rigidity and ambiguity.135 
What is worth mentioning is that these principles as well as customary international law are 
always developing and while not applicable now, they may be in the future. In particular, there 
is increasing support for a looser application of res judicata that does not maintain the 
requirement for the same ‘legal claim’.136 If this requirement eventually falls away, it may be 
harder for adjudicators to deny the effect of PTA jurisdiction provisions. However, since these 
remain uncodified, it will always be uncertain whether specific general principles have been 
set aside by the WTO’s implied supremacy. Similarly, there is uncertainty why or when other 
international law, such as PTAs, cannot be applied. There is a distinction between the 
jurisdiction of a panel, which is expressly limited to the covered agreements, and the applicable 
law that a panel may source to settle the dispute.137 There is nothing in Articles 3(2) and 19(2) 
of the DSU that expressly suggest WTO covered agreements prevail over non-WTO law. The 
current draft appears to mirror this fact. In referencing Article 3(2), it only affirms its relation 
to Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention, which deal exclusively with interpretation and 
say nothing about the applicable law. Some Members have observed that in the current draft 
text, there is an apparent contradiction between the assertion that WTO law is part of public 
international law, which ‘should not be treated in isolation’, and subsequent guidance that 
suggests recourse to public international law is not seen favourably.138 Juridical reasoning to 
date appears to suggest that application is limited to procedural matters and that substantive 
application would interfere with the collective obligations and standards the WTO established. 
We believe this adequately represents the WTO membership’s intention, as it would be 
pointless to multilateralisation to allow states to simply and at will contract out of standards 
they consented to be bound. However, the current stance appears to go too far and we note two 
matters. Firstly, it is unlikely that the Membership intended to set aside all substantive non-
WTO law such as certain provisions contained in the Vienna Convention and ILC Articles. If 
the WTO must retain its closed regime, then the DSU must more expressly state what rules do 
not conflict or at least provide a list of factors, which adjudicatory bodies must consider to 
assess whether there is in fact a conflict, such as its effect on WTO members and the collective 
purposes of WTO law. The currently implied setting aside offers no certainty within the system. 
Secondly, to give better effect to system integration of PTAs and non-WTO law, an alternate 
interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) may be enforced through issuing a new interpretive note. This 
is discussed more thoroughly in the next sub-section. 
 
2 The Interpretive Approach to Use in World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
 
The purpose of this proposal is stated to clarify the relationship between WTO dispute 
settlement and public international law, which is not clearly set out in the DSU, and provide 
guidance for what would be an appropriate role for public international law.139 Problematically, 
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the current draft appears to follow earlier determinations which may be seen as 
contradictory.140 One participant observed that there was no consistent rule that had been 
applied in addressing the extent to which arguments based on public international law are 
acceptable.141 It was suggested that the structure of the text could be improved to clarify the 
elements of Aritlce 31(3)(c).142 The United States affirms the restrictive approach taken in EC 
– Biotech to ensure interpretation does not differ depending on the parties to the dispute and 
that Members would not see their obligations affected without their consent.143 This appears to 
best reflect the collective nature of WTO law and ‘common intention’. However, the restrictive 
approach appears to go too far and it surely was not the common intention to deny any form of 
system integration with other sources of international law. Adjudicatory bodies have been 
hamstrung by this interpretation and it seems apparent in cases such as EC – Aircraft that they 
are looking for a lifeline to account for individual Member’s other international agreements.144 
We posit that an interpretation similar to McGrady’s proposal could satisfy both requirements 
for upholding WTO rights and obligations while also promoting system integration.145 We 
build on this approach now and further note that such an argument could be raised and effective 
without express changes to the DSU. ‘Parties’ interpreted as ‘parties to the treaty’ seems a 
necessary prerequisite. However, ‘in relations between the parties’ could be interpreted more 
generally to mean either parties as a subset or as a matter contemplated or relevant to all parties 
to the treaty. Indeed, given that Article XXIV was expressed in Peru – Agricultural Products 
as a collective provision, not of purely bilateral inter se effect, expressly provided for in WTO 
law, then it would be difficult to deny that a PTA does not actually fit as a matter contemplated 
within the relations between the parties. ‘Applicable’ then relates to a matter of scope and how 
it could apply to the treaty under interpretation. The applicability of the PTA would be a high 
threshold set to not be detrimental towards other Members. In this regard, it would follow a 
similar test to Article 41 of the Vienna Convention. However, unlike inter se modification 
which is not permissible, nothing is limited with respect to interpretation. In fact, reading 
Article 3(2) of the DSU together with Article XXIV would suggest the Membership consented 
to this type of systemic integration. A further point is that ‘taken into account’, as the ILC 
suggests, merely refers to consideration and is not legally binding. Under this approach, a 
broader array of international law could be taken into account but its application would be 
limited to not alter the uniform interpretation of WTO law to the detriment of other Members. 
A simple application would exist when the meaning of a term in WTO law is not easily 
determinable, the availability of extraneous agreements could aid interpretation to better gauge 
its intent. More difficult is a situation like that in Peru – Agricultural Products where the WTO 
law was clear. It was argued that ‘shall maintain’ in light of the PTA should be interpreted as 
‘may’.146 Strictly, in this case, the effect of this interpretation would not have interfered with 
the rights and obligations of other Members. Notwithstanding all other potential considerations 
affecting applicability, a narrow interpretation, respecting that international law also presumes 
against conflict, would be to say that the WTO law be interpreted as ‘shall’ except with regard 
to this specific PTA. This prima facie may appear to run into the same problem that 
interpretation is different depending on the parties to a dispute. However, the basis is not on 
the disputing parties here. The interpretation still applies equally across all WTO members, but 
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here the PTA parties receive beneficial standing by reference to the PTA applicable to them. 
In this situation, the outcome is achieved by a PTA, consensually formed and consistent with 
the WTO, allowing the interpretation to be maintained rather than merely being altered because 
of the parties to the dispute. Such an approach would require a radical shift by adjudicators. 
But, conceptually it shows a way to give effect to greater systemic integration within the limits 
of WTO law. Worries for such an approach being exploited should be limited by the high 
threshold of applicability, its non-binding nature to apply and existing law preventing deviation 
merely to undermine an agreement. 
 
The DSB proposal also seeks to provide guidance on how to deal with situations of ambiguity 
whether constructive or unintended.147 Negotiations have emphasised that panels and the 
Appellate Body cannot derogate from Article 3(2) of the DSU and that any form of 
modification or gap-filling is prohibited.148 Notwithstanding the limited potential to not adopt 
a report, it makes more sense that adjudicators be given guidance before a dispute so they can 
make correct determinations the first time.149 Participants asked if, in cases of ambiguity, the 
proposal would require adjudicators to decline to make findings, thereby somehow subtracting 
from intended obligations and also whether it would be relevant for adjudicators to analyse the 
intent of constructive ambiguity.150 Echoing Trachtman, the proponent submitted that it is not 
necessary to assess the intent to include the ambiguity; but where textual intent cannot be 
discerned after applying the Vienna Convention, adjudicators would have to decline.151 
However, the current DSU and WTO agreements are not clear enough for adjudicators to 
properly make this distinction.152 Accepting the difficulty to clarify the intention behind every 
provision, a possible solution, though not explored in this article, is the potential for the DSB 
to comment, before appeal, on any points of appeal which might inappropriately lead to gap-
filling. Still, question remains whether an adjudicator is bound to rule when confronted with 
silence.153 In answering this article’s concern about an inappropriate lacuna in international 
law, the DSB clarifies that the intention is not to have a situation of non liquet but to prevent 
the ambiguity serving as the basis of a successful claim or defence.154 The difficulty appears to 
be in how such guidance and intent can be expressed. This article suggests that gap-filling is 
an issue that is created out of necessity when intent cannot be properly gauged. Indeed, the 
restrictive approach to Article 31(3)(c) limits the sources that adjudicators may take into 
account to do so. Opening up additional sources of public international law through the 
previously mentioned methods will allow adjudicators to more accurately interpret the rights 
and obligations of parties without resorting to unnecessary judgment calls that may fall into the 
area of law-making. 
 
V Conclusion 
 
The proliferation of PTAs along with institutional proliferation has increased the complexity 
of legal and technical trade rules. Overlaps across agreements and institutions have fragmented 
rights and obligations and created impediments to an efficient dispute settlement system. It is 
not sufficient to merely lock out or turn a blind eye to the proliferation of PTAs now that they 
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are an established part of world trade. The WTO must acknowledge the changing trade 
environment to retain legitimacy as a body and preserve the effective functioning of the system 
as intended.155 This article submitted that, in order to resolve the apparent inconsistencies, the 
WTO will need to loosen its self-proclaimed title to supremacy and respect other sources of 
public international law equally. The DSU should be amended with its own forum choice and 
exclusion provisions to give effect to PTA procedures where it would not significantly 
undermine the rights of the WTO membership. As a secondary mode of harmonisation, the 
DSB must take a broader approach to the use of public international law to respect Members’ 
bilateral obligations. A new approach to interpretation, referencing extraneous law, will allow 
WTO law to remain dynamic and adapt to the changing requirements of international trade.  
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